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{So F. No. 18975. In Bank. July 20, 1954.J 
DOLORES DUNN, as Special Administratrix, etc., Appellant. 
v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (a 
Corporation). Respondent. 
[1] Appw-Dismissal-Judgment or Order Ineffectual-Nonsuit. 
-Order granting motions for judgment of nonsuit, not having 
been entered in minutes prior to entry of written judgment of 
nonsuit, is ineffective and a purported appeal therefrom wiU 
be dismissed . 
. [2] Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.-A motion for 
nonsuit may properly be granted only when, disregarding 
conflicting evidence and giving plaintifrs evidence all the value 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 48; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 42. 
Mclt. Dig. References: (1] Appeal and Error, § 912.5; [2] Dis-
missal, § 75; [3] Electricity, § 3: [4, 7] Electricity, § 17: [5] Elec-
tricity, § 21(2); [6] Electricity, § 16; [8] Easements, § 35; [9) 
Electricity, '21; [10-12) Electricity, § 3L 
. ) 
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to which it i~ legally entitled, indulging in evel'Y legitimate in-
ference which may be drawn therefrom, the result is a de-
termination that there is DO evidence of sufficient substantiality 
to support a verdict for plainti1'f. • 
(31 Electricity - Regulation - Required Olearance.-Where sub-
paragraph (a) of rule M.4-A(2) of Public Utilities Commis-
sion provides that in rural districts minimum clearance of 
power lines may be reduced to 22 feet above ground "for 
conductors crossing or overhanging traversable portions of 
public or private roads or driveways," and subparagraph (b) 
of such rule provides that in rural districts the clearance may 
be reduced to 18 feet "for lines across areas capable of being 
traversed by agricultural equipment and along roads where no 
part of the line overhangs any traversable portion of a public 
or private roadway," subparagraph (b) of rule is applicable in 
action against Electric Company to recover for death of one 
who was electrocuted when dump truck's elevated body came 
in contact with company's power line in rural district "near" 
a· road which such power line crossed at some points, there 
being no evidence to show that accident occurred on road area 
nor how near to it. 
(4] Id.-Injuries-Degree of Care.-One maintaining wires carry-
ing electricity is required to exercise the care that a person 
of ordinary prudence would exercise under the circumstances, 
and in view of dangerous character of electricity and inherent 
risk of injury to persona or property if it escapes, the care 
used must be commenaurate with and proportionate to that 
danger • 
(6] Id.-Injuries--InsulatioD.-Wires carrying electricity must 
be carefully and properly inaulated, by those maintaining them, 
at all places where there is reasonablfl probability of injury to 
persons or property therefrom. 
(8] Id.-Injuries-InspeetloD.-Persona controlling electric power 
line have duty of reasonable and prompt inspection of wires 
and appliances and should be diligent therein. 
(7] Id.-Injuriea-kercise ot Oar.-To Whom Duty Extenda.-
A company operating electric power line over a customer's 
premises owes every person rightfully on premises duty to use 
care to avoid injury to persona or property, and such duty is 
obviated only as to trespassers and individuals unlawfully OD 
premises. 
{S] Easements - Extent ot Vser - Rights of Owners of Servient 
Eatates.-A right of way granted to electric company to main-
tain ita linea on or over a eustomers private property is not 
[4] Liability for injuries from electrio wires, notes, 14 A.L.B. 
1023; 56 A.L.R. 102L See also OaLJur .. Electricity, III et seq.; 
Am • .Tur .. 174 et seq. 
/ 
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exclusive of ordinary use of property by such owner and ita 
agents or servants. 
[9] Electricity-Injuries-Failure to Raise Wires to Required 
Reight.-A power company which has knowledge of hazard 
created by filling and grading of land underneath its high Tolt-
age wires, with resultant raising of ground level and reduc-
tion of clearance between wires and ground below minimum 
requirements of rules of Public Utilities Commission, must 
raise wires so as to make them comply with safety order of 
commission (General Order 95), and fact that property owner 
in creating such hazard is guilty of negligence proximately 
contributing to personal injuries thereafter resulting does not 
operate to relieve power company from liability for unreason-
able delay in raising wires. 
[10] ld.-Injuries-Questions of Law and Fa.ct.-In action against 
electric company to recover for death of park district's em-
ploye who was electrocuted when dump truck's elevated body 
came in contact with one of company's high tension wires, a 
finding is not compelled as a matter of law that deceased, who 
was lawfully on park property, was a trespasser as to power 
company where evidence does not show that he himself con-
tacted or caused contact with company's wires. 
[11] ld.-Injuries-Questions of Law and Fact.-In action against 
electric company to recover for death of park district's em-
ploye who was electrocuted when dump truck's elevated body 
came in contact with one of company's high tension wires, 
question of reasonableness of company's delay in raising wires 
after its knowledge of danger created by filling and grading 
of land under wires, with resultant reduction of clearance be-
tween wires and ground, should not be determined as a matter 
of law on company's motion for nonsuit, but should go to jury 
although plaintiff offered no evidence as to what would con-
stitute a reasonable time within which company should have 
installed new poles to raise wires, but rested on showing that 
installation was commenced "shortly after" accident and 
some 27 hours after hazardous condition came to attention of 
company's foreman. 
(12] ld.-Injuries-Questions of Law and Fa.ct.-In action against 
electric company to recover for death of park district's em-
ploye who was electrocuted when dump truck's elevated body 
came in contact with one of company's high tension wires, 
deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law merely beeause he had received repeated warnings 
from company's agents or employes not to participate in 
lI.11ing operations under the wires, where there were no eye-
witnesses to accident and no evidence as to why or how de-
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that deceased might have heen attemptiug to save truck driver, 
who was also electrocuted, and where, in any event, plaintiff 
was entitled to rely on statutory presumption that deeeased 
was exercising due care (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, suhd. 4) 
and to have jury so instructed, 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County and from an order granting motions for judg-
ment of nonsuit. Hugh H. Donovan, Judge. Judgment re-
versed; appeal from order dismissed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment of IlOIl- ! 
suit reversed. 
William B. Mead and Cyril Viadro for Appellant. 
Robert H. Gerdes, Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold, John 
Ormasa and Robert Collins for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this wrongful death action, plaintiff 
administratrix appeals from an order and judgment of non· 
suit. The decedent met his death by electrocution when the 
elcv~ted bed of a dump truck came into contact with one of 
defendant's high tension wires, For the reasons hereinafter 
"Iucidated we have concluded that the issues involved should 
!;a,'e gone to the jury, and, hence, that the judgment should 
l,t' I'e versed. 
[1] Preliminarily, it is noted that plaintiff has filed two 
separate notices of appeal, one from the written "Judgment 
of Non-Suit" entered November 28, 1951, and the other from 
an order granting "motions for a judgment of non-suit" 
which was not entered in the court's permanent minutes until 
April 15, 1952. Since such order was not entered until sub-
sequent to the entry of the written judgment the order is 
wholly ineffective and the purported appeal therefrom will 
be dismissed. 
[2] With respect to the merits of the appeal, it is to be 
recalled that a nonsuit may be granted only when, disre-
garding ~nfiicting evidence, giving to plaintiff's evidence 
all the value to which it is legally entitled and indulging in 
every legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evi-
dence favorable to plaintiff's case, the result is a determination 
that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. (Raber v. Tumin (1931), 
36 Ca1.2d 654, 656 [226 P.2d 574] ; see also Sokolow v. City 
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From the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, it appears tJ:at the (leccrlcnt, Austin Dunn, was 
employed as a bulldozer operator by the East Bay Regional 
Park District. During the work week beginning Monday, 
June 20, 1949, the district commenced to fill and level a 
portion of ita Tilden Park property in Contra Costa County 
as a preliminary in construction of a golf driving range and 
parking area. The flll material, consisting of dirt and rocks, 
was hauled to the area by employes and trucks of defendant 
Freethy,! a contractor who was doing other construction work I 
nearby and who needed a place to dump such materials. Since, 
as stated by plainti«, the district "apparently needed what 
he had to dump, it had previously author1ad him to do so." 
Dunn's job was to spread the dirt and rocks with a bull-
dozer. The district's golf course superintendent, Collins, 
W8& in charge of the construction, but when he was busy else-
where Dunn would tell the truck drivers where to dump. 
Defendant, pursuant to an easement granted to it by the 
park district, owned and maintained three UDinsulated high 
tension (12,500 volts of electricity) wires, which extended in 
a north-south direction over a portion of the contemplated im-
provement. By Wednesday morning, June 22, the filling, 
leveling and grading of the area underneath the wires had 
been completed, with a resultant raising of the ground level 
and reducing of the clearance at that point by approximately 
6 feet, leaving the distance between the wires and the ground 
at 12 feet 6 inches. Collins instructed the truck drivers not 
to dump anything more in that particular area and told Dunn 
QQt to push anything there. Thereafter" all the work was 
being done to the west or to the east of the wires." Up to 
this time defendant had neither notice nor knowledge that the 
clearance of ita wires had been impaired. On Thursday 
morning, June 23, a crew of defendant's workmen went to 
the area to install a transformer. The foreman of the crew 
saw loaded trucks proceeding under the high voltage wires 
and that the reduced clearance caused by the flll created a 
dangerous situation. He spoke with Collins concerning the 
danger of the impaired clearance and the high voltage, and 
Collins immediately started stopping the truck drivers and 
telling them that the wires were hot and to stay out from 
under them. Hickman was one of the truck drivers he warned. 
1Freeth7 is not a pal't7 to this appeal, and the record does not diaelOM 
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Plaint.iff'fI decedent, Dunn, was present and Collins warned 
him at the same time, 8.'1 well as "se,eral" other times, "every 
time 1 was around him" both on Thurs(\ay and {4'riday. Both 
Hickman and Dunn stated that they would avoid the wires. 
Upon inquiry from Collins, defendant'8 foreman stated his 
company would have. to put in a high~r pole. 
That afternoon (Thursday) Rucker, a supervisor of de-
fendant '8 pole and transmission line department, who had 
received a report of the dangerous condition, went to the 
area. He saw trucks passing under the wires. He spoke with 
Dunn, and •• cautioned him about the proximity of the wires 
and warned him that they were twelve thousand volts and 
that there should be no more dumping there," and that 
neither trucks nor Dunn's bulldozer should go under the 
wires. Dunn said he had already been warned by another of 
defendant's men "previously that day. "Rncker then located 
Tom Flood,· chief aide to the district manager of the park 
district, who "seemed to be very pleased that I had showed 
up, because he said that morning he had noticed the fill was 
getting close to the line and intended to call us, but he hadn't 
done so." Rucker and Flood looked the area over together 
and Rucker told Flood" there shouldn't b~ any more dumping 
within ten feet of the line, and he agreed that that would be 
the case, and called Mr. Dunn [decedent] over, and in my 
presence instructed him not to permit any more dumping 
within ten feet of the lin". At that time 1 again cautioned 
Mr. Dunn as to the voltage of the line ... " Dunn and Flood 
both stated "no more dumping would be permitted in the ar~a 
where there was impaired clearance . . . and no closer than 
ten feet on either side of these wires." Rucker also told 
Flood "I would have an estimator out to see him the next 
morning about installing a pole at the edge of the fill." 
Flood testified that he had realized, prior to the discussion 
with Rucker, that the wires were low, of high voltage, and 
a danger to life, and had ., cautioned the trucks to stay out 
from under it .•.• Mr. Dunn and I had discussed it, because 
we knew that the pole had to be put in there before the job 
was complete •.• (W]e discussed the fact that we wouldn't 
-shouldn't put any more fill in there; the wire was too low." 
On Wednesday Flood had told Dunn not to operate tractors 
under the wires and not to permit the trucks to go under 
them. Flood had intended to notify defendant of the dan-
gerous condition but had not done so. He testified that be 
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returned to bis office, reported the condition to his super-
visor, and asked him to al'Tange to have an estimator meet 
l!~lood on Friday morning. Friday morning Collins again 
told both Dunn and the truck drivers to stay out from under 
the wires and not to dump or push anything in there. 
About one o'clock Friday afternoon Adams,an employe 
of the district, drove Dunn in a trash truck from the park 
clubhouse toward the parking area. Dunn got off the truck 
on the road leading into that area, and when· last seen by 
Adams, Dunn was some 700. to 800 feet from the wires and 
walking in their general direction. As Adams continued on 
to the driving range shack he saw a dump truck coming 
into the area. Adams went into the shack and talked a couple 
of minutes with the carpenter. The two men then walked 
outside and saw both Dunn and Hickman lying on the ground 
near the dump truck, which was under the high tension wires. 
The bed of the truck was elevated and touched one of the 
wires. Dunn moved his arms, hitting a wheel of the truck, 
and "there was a big flash." Hickman, who was lying face 
down under and parallel to the truck's fender, was also 
moving, and there was a flash every time his back and 
shoulders touched the running board. As Hickman moved 
he touched Dunn, and both men were electrocuted. The same 
afternoon, "shortly after" the accident, defendant's crew 
arrived and commenced installation of a pole to raise the 
wires. There were no other eyewitnesses to the oecUl'Tence. 
In support of the nonsuit, defendant urges, first, that the 
evidence shows as a matter of law that it breached no duty 
, of care owing to the decedent, Dunn, and therefore was guilty 
of no negligence toward him. It also contends that as a matter 
of law the evidence establishes both contributory negligence 
by Dunn. and that the sole proximate cause of Dunn's death 
was the intervening act of Hickman in raising the truck bed 
so that it touched one of the wires. 
Plaintiff, contending that the case should have gone to 
the jury on each of these points, argues that under rules set . 
forth in General Order 95 of the Public Utilities Commission 
defendant was required to maintain the wires at a minimum 
clearance of 22 feet, that such rules established a standard 
of care which defendant had violated by maintaining a clear-
ance of only 18 feet 6 inches even before the filling work here 
involved, and that plaintiff was entitled to have a jury de. 
termine whether such ,.iolation constituted negligence towards 
the decedent, Dunn. Rule 37 of General Order 95 establishes 
/ 
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a basic minimum clearance of 25 feet above the ground along 
thoroughfares in rural districts or across other areas capable 
of being traversed by vehicles or agricultural equipment. 
Subparagraph (a) of rule 54.4·A (2) permits rcduction of 
the clearance to 22 feet in rural districts, "for conductors 
crossing or overhanging traversable portions of public or 
private roads or driveways." Subparagraph (b) of the same 
rule states that in rural districts the clearance may be re-
duced to 18 feet "for lines across areas capable of being 
traversed by agricultural equipment and along roads where 
no part of the line overhangs any traversable portion of a 
public or private roadway." 
[3] In 1948 the district had granted defendant the ease-
ment for the lines here involved. Both prior to such grant, 
and also at the time of the accident, a road existed which 
crossed under the lines at a point where they were less than 
22 feet above ground before the filling operations. The acci-
dent to Dunn occurred "near" the road, but the evidence 
does not show that it occurred on the road area nor how near 
to it. It thus appears that subparagraph (b) of rule 54..4-A (2) 
applies, since the area was in a rural district and capable of 
being traversed by agricultural equipment. Subparagraph 
(a) of that rule, requiring a 22-foot clearance, when read in 
the light of subparagraph (b), clearly applies only to lines 
crossing or overhanging traversable portions of public or 
private roads and does not mean that if the lines cross a 
roadway in a rural district the 22-foot clearance must be 
maintained for the entire district. Prior to the filling done 
by the district, the lines were some 6 inches above the 18-
foot height required by subparagraph (b). In any event it 
was not the height at which defendant had maintained its 
wires before the fill but, rather, the greatly reduced clear-
ance which existed after the fill, which contributed to the 
tragedy. 
With respect to the impaired clearance existing after the 
filling operations, plaintiff states in her brief that she does 
not seek to hold defendant "liable for having created the 
dangerous condition. It makes no difference who created it. 
The important point is that, after the level of the parking 
area was raised, a dangerous condition existed. We seek to 
hold defendant liable for having allowed it to remain for 
an unreasonable length of time." The time charged as being 
unreasonable is approximately 27 hours. 
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525 [159 P.2d 931], this court stated that" On the subject of 
negligence the standard of care is, that one maintaining wires 
carrying electricity is required to exercise the care that a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the cir· 
cumstances. Among the circumstances are the well known 
dangerous character of electricity and the inherent risk of 
injury to persons or property if it escapes. Hence, the care 
used must be commensurate with and proportionate to that 
danger. [Citations.] [5] Specific application of that standard 
requires that wires carrying electricity must be carefully and 
properly insulated by those maintaining them at all places 
where there is a reasonable probability of injury to persons 
or property therefrom. [Citations.] [6] Upon those controlling 
such instrumentality and force is imposed the duty of reason-
able and prompt inspection of the wires and appliances and 
to be diligent therein. [Citations.] And, in the places where 
there is a probability of injury, they must not only make 
the wires safe by proper insulation, but as stated in Dow 
v. Sunset Tel. &- Tel. 00., 157 Cal. 182, 186 [106 P. 587], 
'keep them so by vigilant oversight and repair.''' In the 
Polk case defendant city's power line extended along the line 
of a city street right of way, and passed through the branches 
and foliage of trees growing on private property but spread-
ing over the street. The wires, located some 42 to 45 feet 
above ground, were insulated. Plaintiff, a workman engaged 
by the property owner to trim the trees, was injured when 
his pruning hook touched a section of the wires from which 
the insulation had been worn off by friction with one of the 
tree limbs; judgment in his favor was affirmed. 
[7] In Lozano v. Pacific Gas &; Elec. 00. (1945),70 Cal.App. 
2d 415, 420, 422 [161 P.2d 74], in which two workmen were 
killed when a light tower they were pushing came in contact 
with an uninsulated wire 43 feet above ground and run· 
ning over their employer's land, it is declared that the de· 
fendant company's duty "to use care so as to avoid injury to 
persons or property was established by a clear showing that 
the company owned, maintained and operated the power line 
in question. [Citations.] Such duty extended to every person 
rightfully on the premises and was obviated only as to tres-
passers and individuals unlawfully there at the time of injury. 
[Citations. ] • .. [8] The right of way granted to the com-
pany to construct, maintain and service its lines on or over the 
customer's private property was not exclusive of the ordi-
nary use of the property by said owuer and its agents or 
) 
2i4 DUNN V. l'A\.:II:'[(; GA:-: &. F.L";C'fIHC CO. l43 C.~d 
servants. [Citations.]" After referring to the principles 
quoted hereinabove from the Polk case, the court continues, 
"The duty of due carc with which the company was charged 
consists not only in the proper installation of the dangerous 
instrumentality but in the maintenance thereof in a saft> 
condition at all times and places and under the changing 
circumstances of the particular case. Even if at the outset 
of the installation of equipment the company may have been 
entirely free from fault, yet, if, under changing circum-
stances, a hazardous condition &rose, nonaction or the failure 
to remedy such condition would constitute culpable negli-
gence. [Citations, including the Polk case, supra.]" In the 
Lozano case one of defendant power company's agents had 
learned, some two to four months before the accident, that 
the light towers being used in the employer's operations on 
his land were higher than the agent had assumed them to be. 
Judgment against the company on jury verdicts, was affirmed. 
Despite the holdings of the Polk and Lozano cases de-
fendant urges that the park district and its employes in 
making the fill were trespassing upon defendant's right of 
way. It is true that the making of the fill with resulting 
impaired clearance below the wires was not "the ordinary 
use of the property by . . . [the] owner and its agents or 
servants," but this fact alone is not an adequate answer to the 
problem. Defendant relies on Po,cific Gas d Elec. Co. v. 
Minnette (1953), U5 Cal.App.2d 698, 701 [252 P.2d 642], 
but that case determines nothing which is controlling here. 
There, the grantors of the easement had covenanted with the 
company not to I' erect or maintain any building or other 
structure on the right of way";' subsequp-ntly a building was 
erected directly beneath the company's wires. with its roof 
only four feet below them. The company sued to quiet title 
'In the present ease the grant of defendant'. easement reads as follows: 
"EAST BAY REGIONAL PAIIX DISTB.ICT, a California park district, here-
inafter ealled first party, does hereby grant to PACIPlC GAS AND EaCTB.IO 
COMPANY, a California corporation, hereinafter ealled second party, its 
successors and assigns, the right to erect, maintain, replace, remove and 
use a line of poles with all necessaJ'1 and proper crossarm., braces, 
anchors, guys and other appliances and ib:tures for use in connection 
therewith, and to suspend therefrom, maintain and use such wires as 
second party shall from time to time deem nocessaJ'1 for the transmission 
and distribution of electric energy, together with a right of way along 
said line of poles, over and across those certain premises, eituate in the 
County of Contra CO!ita, State of California, wbicbare deseribed as fol-
lows: [Description.] Said right includes the trimming by s!'eond party 
. of any trees along said poles and wires whenever considered necesaal7 
for the complete enjoyment thereof." 
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to its easement alJd for II. nllwdatoJ'y injlJlwt.ioli r(''111 j I·j II:,! 
removal of the building. No (lIH'stion was before t.hf~ ('!llIrt 
relative to the duty or lill.bility of the company in respect 
to a continuing dangerous condition which the company had 
not created but which involved its property and of which it 
had notice. 
Youngstown Steel etc. 00. v. Oity of Los Angeles (1952), 
38 Cal.2d 407 [240 P.2d 977], holds that the owner of property 
over which defendaut city held a right of way to erect and 
maintain power poles and wires was obliged to pay the cost 
of raising the wires where such raising was desired by it in 
order to permit it to safely operate a new and higher type 
of crane, but does not suggest that a power company whose 
wires became a hazard under the circumstances present in 
the instant case could refrain from moving them to a safe 
height despite the fact that the property owner whose opera-
tions created the hazard may be liable for the cost of the 
change. [9] We are persuaded that in view of the ex-
tremely dangerous character of wires carrying high voltage 
electricity the better and more humane rule is that stated in 
Bickham v. Southern Oal. Edison 00. (1953), 120 Cal.App. 
2d 815, 820 [263 P.2d 32]: that after such a hazard comes 
to the kuowledge of the power company it is required to so 
raise the wires as to make them comply with the safety order 
(General Order 95) and that "it is inconceivable" that the 
power company would refuse to make such a change. The 
fact that the property owner in creating the hazard caused 
by an impaired clearance is guilty of negligence proximately 
contributing to personal injuries thereafter resulting should 
not, and we believe does not, operate to relieve the power 
company from liability for an nnreasonll.ble delay (if there 
was such) in raising the wires. Indeed, in oral argument 
before this court, defendant conceded its duty to raise the 
wires as "to certain people," although arguing that the duty 
did not extend to Dunn by reason of the latter's alleged 
contributory negligence. 
On this point defendant contends that as to it Dunn was 
a trespasser to whom its only duty was to abstain from 
wilful or wanton injury, but that even if he be considered an 
invitee defendant had fulfilled its duty by warning him of 
the danger. (See Raber v. Tumin (1951), supra, 36 Ca1.2d 
654, 658; Popejoy v. Hannon (1951), 37 Cal.2d 159, 170 
[231 P.2d 484].) In Hall v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Ltd., 
(1934), 137 Cal.App. 449 [30 P.2d 1013], plaintiff, an em-
) 
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ploye of an ,·Iretrical contractor, waR sent to disconnect till' 
electrical power from a PUlUll-hollsl' whidl t.he owner wiRhrd 
to dismantlc so the pump could be moved. Plaintiff climbed 
defendant's power pole and cut the wires at a point where 
live wires would not be left lying on the ground. With the 
support of the wires thus removed, the pole, later discovered 
to have been partially decayed, broke and fell to the ground, 
injuring plaintiff. Plaintiff was held to have been a trespasser 
as to defendant, and judgment of nonsuit was affirmed. In 
Strother v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 
525,529 [211 P.2d 624], it was held that plaintiffs had failed 
to state a cause of action for deaths resulting when an airplane, 
while approaching an air field and attempting to land, collided 
with wires maintained by defendant over its own land and 
some 26 feet above the ground; the court declared that "Being 
trespassers, the owner of the land owed plaintiffs no duty to 
waru them of the hazard of the wires." And in Leslie v. 
City of Monterey (1934), 139 Cal.App. 715, 720 [34 P.2d 
837], defendant city, which owned and operated a baseball 
park, awarded a contract for the erectiou of a fence and 
backstop around the park. Plaintiff was an employe of the 
contractor. The fence had been moved five feet into the 
street from the property line, and plaintiff was injured when 
a steel pole which he was helping to raise into place at one 
point along the fence came into contact with an overhead 
22,000-volt line. A nonsuit was granted in favor of the city, 
and on appeal plaintiff's judgment against defendant power 
company, who owned and maintained the wires, was reversed 
upon the authority of the Hall case, supra, with the declara-
tion that plaintiff was a trespasser. [10] However, since 
the evidence in the present case does not show that Dunn him-
self contacted or caused a contact with defendant '8 wires, 
we are convinced that in accord with the principles ennnciated 
in the Polk and Lozano cases a finding is not compelled as a 
matter of law that Dunn, who was lawfully npon the park 
property, was a trespasser as to defendant power company. 
(See also Jackson v. Utica Light & Power Co. (1944),64 Cal. 
App.2d 885, 889 [149 P.2d 748] ; Langazo v. San Joaquin L. & 
P. Corp. (1939),32 Cal.App.2d 678, 685-690 [90 P.2d 825].) 
And this is true even if we assume that defendant's easement 
carried with it a right to have the established clearance of its 
wires remain nnimpaired until it had notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to raise the wires (presumably at the expense of 
the park district) to legally accommodate the proposed fill, 
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and even if we assume (we do not so !.lecide) that the park !lis-
trict was a trespafCscr wIlen it impaired the clearance without 
notice. 
[11] In view of the rules noted hereinabove, it thus ap-
pears that unless the evidence is as a matter of law insuffi-
cient to sustain a finding that defendant was negligent in 
·having allowed the danger to remain for an unreasonable 
length of time before raising the wires, the question of de-
fendant's negligence should have gone to the jury. Plaintiff 
offered no evidence as to what would constitute a reasonable 
time within which defendant should have installed the new 
poles to raise the wires, but rested upon the showing that 
the installation was commenced "shortly after" the accident 
and some 27 hours after the hazardous condition came to the 
attention of defendant's foreman on Thursday morning.· 
This proof is slight but regardless of what we, or some of us, 
might thiI:k we should find if the question were before us as 
triers of faCT, we are persuaded as a court of review that the 
matter of wh~ther or not the delay was reasonable should 
not be determined as a matter of law upon defendant's motion 
for a nonsuit, but instead should go to the jury after, of 
course, defendant is first afforded opportunity to produce 
evidence that it acted promptly and with due care under 
the circumstances. 
Cases relied upon by defendant in support of its further 
contention that the sole proximate cause of Dunn's fatal acci-
de~t was Hickman's act of drh'ing his dump truck under 
the wires where the elevated bed could touch them, rather 
than any negligence by defendant, appear to involve situa-
tions where defendant had no reason to anticipate danger, or 
else no duty to make changes in the location or elevation of 
its wires in order to accommodate the convenience of others in 
their operations carried on in close proximity to the wires. (See 
Pascoe v. Southern Cal. Edison 00. (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 
254, 258-259 [227 P.2d 555] ; Hayden v. Paramount Produc-
tions, Inc. (1939),33 Cal.App.2d 287, 291-292 [91 P.2d 231] ; 
.~tasulat v. Pacific Ga.~ ~ Elec. Co. (1937), 8 Cal.2d 631, 
637-638 [67 P.2d 6781 : Sfackpole v. Pad-fic Gas ~ Elec. 00. 
"There was also eviuence that after defendant's superintendent. Rucker, 
inspected the area on Thursdny afternoon lIe Asked his supervisor to have 
an "estimator" meet the parI, district ofli~ial Flood, but whl'ther this 
relates to discn~sions with the district as to bearing tbc cost of changing 
the wires or, if it did so, whether it contributed to any delay in action by 
_~efeDdant, is not shown. 
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(1919), 181 Cal. 700, 705 [186 P. 354]; Sweatman v. Los 
.4.ngcles Gas &- Elec. Corp. (1929), 101 Cal.App. 318. 326 
t281 P. 677].) In Benard v. Vorlander (1948), 87 Cal.App. 
2d 4:36. 440-441 [197 P.2d 42], the pole line and wires involved 
were owned and maintained by the government rather than 
by the power company, which only energized them. By 
contrast, defendant in the present case was obliged after 
learning of the generally dangerous condition existing after 
the filling operations, to place its wires in a safe condition 
under the changed circumstances, and the questions of whether 
it acted with reasonable promptness and of proximate cause 
should, as stated hereinabove, have been submitted to the jury. 
The danger which existed here was of the very nature ad-
mittedly realized toy defendant's agents when they discovered 
the impaired clearance, and against which they warned Dunn 
and others concerned. (See Jackson v. Utica Light &- Power 
Co. (1944), supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 885, 891-894.) 
[12] Finally, defendant contends that in view of the 
repeated warnings given Dunn, his participation in the filling 
. operations, and his· specific knowledge of the danger, COB-
tributory negligence on his part was shown as a matter of 
law. In the first place, however, there were no eyewitnesses 
to the acccident and no evidence as to why or how Dunn 
came in contact with the electricity and plaintiff suggests 
that he may have been attempting to save Hickman. (See 
Petersen v. Lang Transp. Co. (1939), 32 Cal.App.2d 462. 
467-468 [90 P.2d 94].) In any event plaintiff was en-
titled to rely upon the statutory presumption that Dunn was 
exercising due care (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 4) and 
to have the jury so instructed. (Scott v. Burke (1952), 39 
Ca1.2d 388, 394-395 [247 P.2d 313] ; Jackson v. Utica Light 
&- Power Co. (1944), supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 885, 894-896.) Fur-
ther, in Polk v. City of Los Angeles (1945), supra, 26 Ca1.2d 
519, 524, 529-532, in which plaintiff tree trimmer knew of the 
dangerous character of the wires, saw a sign stating that 
those in question carried a high voltage, and knew that in-
sulation was likely to be worn where rubbed by a tree limb, 
it was held that the question of contributory negligence de-
pends upon the circumstances in each case, and had properly 
been submitted to the jury. (See also Monroe v. San Joaquin 
L. &- P. Corp. (1941),42 Cal.App.2d 641.650 [109 P.2d 720].) 
In Rojas v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1951), 105 Cal.App. 
2d 258, 259 [233 P.2d 141], plaintiff him!;elf testified that he ' 
unintentiQnally brought his aluminum walnut shaker, over 
I 
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;{:t rf'f't. in lPII~th, in NlIltlwt wit.h thc wirf'R overhead, al-
though he unrlerRtood the danger and han Illcant to avoid the 
wires; the court's declaration that one who .. voluntarily 
contacts the wire" after a warning is guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law is not controlling here, where, 
as stated above, the exact circumstances surrounding the 
accident are not completely shown and plaintiff is entitled to 
rely on the presumption of due care. 
It appears that each of the cases involving injuries from 
contact with high tension wires has largely turned on the 
particular facts involved, and we conclude that upon the 
evidence in the record now before us the questions of negli-
gence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury. 
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the purported 
appeal from the order granting "motions for a judgment of 
non-suit" is dismissed. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Spence, J .• 
and Schottky •• J. pro tern.,- concurred. 
THAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment and in the 
opinion, except for the reference to the presumption of due 
carc. Since the burden of proof on the issue of contributory 
negligence was on defendant, no proper purpose is served by 
invoking the presumption. (See dissenting opinion in Speck 
v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 590 [128 P.2d 16].) 
Respondent's petition for a 'rehearing was denied August 
19,1954. 
• Assigned b,. Chairman of Judicial Council. 
